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The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight
Jonathan B. Wiener
The idea of cost-benefit analysis has been spreading internationally for centuries—
at least since an American named Benjamin Franklin wrote a letter in  to
his British friend, Joseph Priestley, recommending that Priestley weigh the pros
and cons of a difficult decision in what Franklin dubbed a “moral or prudential
algebra” (Franklin ) (more on this letter below). Several recent studies show
that the use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), for both public projects and public
regulation of private activities, is now unfolding in countries on every habitable
continent around the world (Livermore and Revesz ; Quah and Toh ;
De Francesco ; Livermore ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). This
global diffusion of BCA is intermingled with the global diffusion of regulatory
capitalism, in which privatized market actors are supervised by expert regulatory
agencies (Levi-Faur ; Simmons et al. ), and with the international spread
of ex ante regulatory precautions to anticipate and prevent risks despite uncertainty (Wiener et al. ).
The spread of regulatory precautions to govern markets and risks, and the
spread of BCA as an analytic method to evaluate public projects and regulatory
policies, have led in turn to the global diffusion of institutional systems for regulatory oversight. This chapter addresses the diffusion of such regulatory oversight
systems, which often employ BCA as a tool for policy evaluation (typically under
the rubric of regulatory impact assessment, RIA).
The diffusion of regulatory oversight systems using RIA, closely following the
diffusion of regulation and precaution, makes intuitive sense as a mechanism for
accountability and guidance of regulatory power. But this pattern also challenges
conventional claims. First, it shows that orthodox notions of discrete “national
styles of regulation” (Vogel ) and early “legal origins” of modern regulation
(la Porta et al. ) are belied or at least markedly eroded by the modern reality of
the exchange of ideas across complex interconnected and increasingly hybrid regulatory systems. History matters, but it is not destiny; modern regulatory systems
exist in global networks and evolve through learning, borrowing, and hybridization (Levi-Faur ; Wiener et al. ). Second, precaution and RIA/BCA,
though often portrayed as antagonists, are better understood as complementary
components of a deeper trend: the diffusion of regulatory foresight. Both precaution and RIA are efforts to forecast the future consequences of current choices.
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Such regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, ironically, as they become safer.
Both hybridization and foresight are essential strategies for risk management
in a changing world. To make the most of these strategies, this chapter suggests, we
should consciously construct a global policy laboratory—which in turn involves a
bit of regulatory hindsight.

Regulatory Oversight
Regulations can be necessary to correct market failures such as externalities (e.g.,
health, safety, and environmental risks), asymmetric information, and market
power. Regulation can help solve such social problems, but it can also induce its
own problems, including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary
risks, and rent-seeking. As a result, wherever states deploy regulation, demand
arises for oversight of the regulatory system to reduce the costs and side effects
of regulation, increase the benefits of regulation, and promote transparency and
accountability.
Regulatory oversight systems go further than academic or episodic
project-oriented BCA by creating institutions for broad application of RIA (typically using BCA) to evaluate all significant regulatory actions, with a body to
review the RIAs prepared by regulatory agencies (OECD a). The function
of regulatory oversight may be located in the judiciary (judicial review of administrative agency action), the executive (center-of-government regulatory review,
typically in the presidency or head of government, sometimes in an agency or a
multiagency council), the legislature (an expert body assisting the legislature, or
legislative review of administrative action), or an independent entity (such as a
neutral review board, auditor, or ombudsman).
A “regulatory oversight body” (ROB) typically means a centralized government unit atop the executive hierarchy that uses expertise to supervise regulatory
action by agencies (Lindseth, Aman, and Raul ; Wiener and Alemanno ;
Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). ROBs provide both expertise (through
expert staff and analytic methods) and political accountability (such as to the president or prime minister); these objectives may be mutually reinforcing but may
pose tensions at times (Shapiro ).
ROBs may have a variety of functions and powers, including commenting on
(and assisting in improving) the quality of an agency’s RIA; constraining agency
action when an RIA is deemed inadequate or when the benefits of an agency’s
proposed regulation do not justify the costs; calling on agencies to review existing
regulations for their benefits and costs; prompting agency action when BCA identifies a socially promising regulation that agencies are not yet promulgating; and
fostering transparency in the reporting of regulatory impacts. And ROBs’ functions and powers may differ across polities, in part because ROBs may be located
in different branches or units of different constitutional structures accorded different roles and powers, such as parliamentary versus presidential systems. A key
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point here is that the ROB’s authority to guide regulatory decision-making will
depend on its institutional role among the branches or power centers of government (Wiener and Alemanno ). (For more detailed analyses of ROBs’ legal
bases, functions, powers, and constitutional structures, see Wiener and Alemanno
; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ).
For example, in the United States, the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), created in , located within the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in the Executive Office of the President, performs all of these functions pursuant to a series of executive orders issued by several presidents of both
political parties (notably Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order , of , preceding OIRA; Ronald Reagan’s Executive Order , of ; and Bill Clinton’s
Executive Order , of , which remains in force today and has been
extended by Barack Obama’s Executive Orders , and , of , and
, of May ). OIRA regularly exercises its authority to “return” agency regulatory proposals that do not meet the analytic and net benefits criteria set forth
in the executive order, and OIRA has occasionally sent a “prompt” to agencies to
pursue regulations that promise net benefits (Graham ; Revesz and Livermore
). BCA had been employed in the United States to assess public projects for
decades before the creation of OIRA, including for flood control projects and military procurement (Quah and Toh ). Following the wave of regulatory legislation and the expansion of the administrative state during the s and s, the
advent of RIA in the s and OIRA review in the s created an institutional
structure for regulatory oversight—a system that has been reaffirmed in a bipartisan consensus across every subsequent presidential administration (Kagan ;
Wiener and Alemanno ). Many of the U.S. member states have also adopted
RIA systems (Schwartz ). But in the United States, RIAs and OIRA review
are evaluations of agency rulemakings—agency actions to implement authority
delegated by the legislature through statutes—not appraisals of the bills initially
proposed in the legislature.
In the European Union, impact assessment was launched by the Better
Regulation Initiative over – (Wiener ), and the EU Impact
Assessment Board (IAB) was then created in . The IAB, a five-member
board, is located within the Secretariat General in the Presidency of the European
Commission. It began as a commenter on RIA quality and has grown to play
a wider role (Wiener and Alemanno ). Since , the president of the
European Commission has required new regulatory proposals to obtain a positive
opinion from the IAB before going forward (European Commission , –),
giving the IAB an authority more akin to OIRA’s “return letter” than the IAB had
previously had. Strikingly, while the IAB returned for “resubmission” only  percent of regulatory proposals in , by  it was returning  percent (and
then  percent in , perhaps indicating a plateau) (European Commission
, fig. ). And in the EU, impact assessment and IAB review includes evaluations of proposals for legislation—that is, proposals by the Commission that will
be forwarded to the European Parliament and Council. Similarly, in France, the
new Organic Law of April ,  (Loi organique n° – du  avril 
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relative à l’application des articles –,  et  de la Constitution) requires an
impact analysis reviewed by the Conseil d’Etat before a bill can be proposed to
the National Assembly.

Diffusion
Regulatory oversight is now being “diffused throughout the globe” (Radaelli
and De Francesco ). Just as the number of regulatory agencies worldwide
has grown, especially rapidly since about  (Levi-Faur , fig. .), so the
number of ROBs has also grown over that period. Institutions for regulatory oversight have spread from about half of the twenty-seven OECD members in ,
to virtually all of the now thirty-one OECD members in  (Cordova-Novion
and Jacobzone , fig. ) and to virtually all EU members (De Francesco ).
Mechanisms for regulatory oversight are also appearing in international organizations (see the chapter by Alberto Alemanno in this volume).
The creation in  of the ROB at the EU level, the IAB, followed at least five
years of development of an RIA system—starting with the EU’s Better Regulation
initiative and its impact assessment guidelines (Wiener ). Additional examples of ROBs in OECD member states include the Productivity Commission and
the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) in Australia (where RIA has been
employed since ); the Simplification and Better Regulation Unit in Denmark;
the function of the Conseil d’Etat in supervising impact analyses pursuant to the
Organic Law of April , , in France; the Administrative Burdens Board in the
Netherlands; the Better Regulation Unit in Germany; the Administrative Evaluation
Bureau in Japan; the Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria (COFEMER) in
Mexico; the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) and Regulatory Reform Bureau
in South Korea; and the Better Regulation Executive and associated regulatory
committees in the United Kingdom (a survey is provided in Cordova-Novion and
Jacobzone ). In South Korea, spurred by an economic crisis in the s, the
government enacted the Basic Act on Administrative Regulations in , and
the RRC then undertook an extensive review of existing regulations resulting in
thousands of revisions and repeals, as well as RRC oversight of RIAs for newly
proposed regulations (Truen ; Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ). In
Chile, the economic evaluation requirement for environmental regulations (pursuant to Law , of ) has been supplemented by an RIA process created in
Law , of , though it remains unclear whether a ROB will supervise this
RIA process (OECD ). Related systems exist or are being developed in other
OECD members, including New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey
(Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone ).
We can expect the spread of ROBs using RIA, and the collaborative dialogue
among those institutions, to continue. In March , the OECD issued a major
set of twelve recommendations to all governments, including on evaluating regulatory quality, using RIA for both ex ante (prospective) and ex post (retrospective) regulatory review, creating ROBs, and engaging in international regulatory
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cooperation (OECD ). In May , President Obama issued Executive Order
, to promote international regulatory cooperation.
The legal bases, constitutional structures, and powers of these ROBs differ
across countries. Just more than half (so far) of the ROBs in the OECD member states are empowered to review agency RIAs (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone
, fig. ). Some, like US OIRA, review agencies’ proposed regulations to implement statutes already enacted by the legislature; others, like the EU IAB, review
initial proposals for legislation (usually within the branch of government that initiates such proposals); this difference in structure entails differences in interbranch
(executive vs. legislative) relations over policymaking and power (Wiener and
Alemanno ). The U.S. OIRA, the EU IAB, the OBPR in Australia, the RRC in
Korea, and COFEMER in Mexico must generally give a positive opinion for a proposed regulation to proceed, or they have the power to return regulatory proposals
(though there are exceptions in each system) (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone
, table A.). Many or all ROBs can request analytic improvements in a draft
RIA. Japan’s Administrative Evaluation Bureau, the Administrative Burdens board
in the Netherlands, and Germany’s Better Regulation Unit can review the quality
of RIAs but do not return proposed regulations (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone
, table A.). Review of the existing stock of regulations (also known as ex post,
retrospective, or “lookback” review) is being emphasized in the Australian regulatory oversight system (Australian Productivity Commission ) and in the
United States (under Executive Order , issued in ).
RIA and ROBs are also beginning to spread beyond the OECD to developing
countries (Truen ; World Bank Group ; Jacobs ; Kirkpatrick and
Zhang ). In many countries, as was the case in the United States and EU, the
development of BCA as an analytic exercise by academics and project-funding
agencies has preceded the creation of governmental RIA systems and the establishment of ROBs to supervise regulation. Some developing countries are now
moving to adopt formal systems of RIA and to establish ROBs.
Countries seeking to join the EU are adopting RIA: Serbia adopted Rules
of Procedure requiring RIA for new legislation in , after having established
a Council for Regulatory Reform and Quality Control in  (OECD b,
); and Croatia required RIA beginning in  and in  created an RIA
Coordination Office (OECD b, –). But Bulgaria has hesitated to adopt
RIA, despite internal support (Truen ). Turkey has adopted significant administrative reforms, partly in response to encouragement from the EU and partly for
domestic reasons, but apparently has not yet instituted RIA (Sezen ).
Elsewhere, in Russia in  and South Africa in , the OECD held informational workshops on RIA. South Africa has moved ahead to develop a pilot
RIA process supported by the Cabinet Office (Truen ). RIA was adopted for
environmental regulations in Uganda in  (UNEP ), and in Kenya in 
(World Bank Group ). In Brazil, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring
(SEAE) has recently adopted RIA for some sectors (OECD ), although some
observers predict that a broader RIA process in Brazil may turn out to be significantly influenced by political forces (Peci and Sobral ). The use of BCA

08_Livemore_Ch08.indd 127

10/20/2012 2:49:24 AM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 10/20/12, NEWGEN

128

Institutional Matters

has also become widespread across numerous countries in Asia (Quah and Toh
, offering numerous case studies). BCA for both project evaluation and regulatory policy evaluation has been employed in China and India (Livermore ),
although the development of an RIA process for China’s regulatory agencies has
lagged (Hu ). The Philippines has an RIA process supervised by its National
Economic and Development Authority, and is considering establishing an Office
of Best Regulatory Practice to provide expert oversight and advice on this RIA
process (Bird, Plunkett, and Bosworth ). Vietnam adopted RIA in –,
with support from its Administrative Procedure Control Agency, the German
GTZ, and the USAID’s Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (PERQ ; Truen
); an RIA is now required in Vietnam before a bill may be presented to the
National Assembly (Truen ).
More generally, several key concepts in environmental law and risk regulation have experienced considerable diffusion and borrowing around the world,
including BCA through RIA, environmental impact assessment (EIA), emissions
trading (cap and trade), public participation and access to government information, and information disclosure requirements on industry (Busch and Jorgens
; Wiener and Richman ; Ellerman et al. ; Wiener et al. ; Sand
).
Diffusion is a multifaceted concept of the spread of ideas (Levi-Faur ).
Ideas can spread across numerous nodes in complex networks, including among
individuals, groups, civil society, business coalitions, political parties, regions,
agencies, countries, and international organizations (Lazer ). And ideas may
evolve as they spread and be employed differently in different institutional settings. The literature on the diffusion of policy ideas is large (see generally Rose
; Dolowitz and Marsh ; James and Lodge ; Elkins and Simmons
; Berry and Berry ). Closely related concepts of diffusion as an evolutionary process have been developed in sociology (Hagerstrand ), economics (Rogers ), law (Sand ; Watson ; Tushnet ), political science
(Walker ; Lazer ; Weyland ; Simmons et al. ), biology (Arnold
; Grant ; Deakin ), and history of science (Galison ). Legal
scholars have borrowed from biologists the notion of “memes” as the unit, and
counterpart of genes, in the evolution of ideas (Dawkins ; Deakin ). In
biology, evolution was first understood to occur through competition among individuals within a species; later, through field studies, biologists began to appreciate
that evolution also occurs through the exchange of genetic material across species
via interbreeding (called “hybridization”) (Arnold ; Grant ). Likewise, in
law, evolution was initially understood to occur through competition among individual rules within a legal system (Priest ; Elliott ; Farber ; but for
doubts about the efficiency of such legal evolution, see Hadfield ; Roe );
later, through the equivalent of field studies, legal scholars came to appreciate that
legal evolution also occurs through the exchange of legal concepts across legal
systems via borrowing (Watson ; Elliott ; Wiener ; Deakin ;
Wiener ), also called “hybridization” (Wiener , –; Wiener ;
Wiener et al. , –; Delmas-Marty , –).
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There are reasons to expect the diffusion of regulatory policy approaches to
have increased in recent years. The reality of contemporary international relations
and information technology is a world of interconnectedness: networks and the
transnational diffusion of ideas. Slaughter (, ) argues:
We live in a networked world . . . .In this world, the measure of power is connectedness . . . .The twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopolitics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers
as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another . . . .The emerging networked world of the twenty-first century, however, exists above the
state, below the state, and through the state.
Interconnectedness enables the more fluid spread of ideas, and thereby offers
increased opportunities to borrow and collaborate on policy solutions (Lazer
). Regulatory ideas are increasingly being borrowed across the Atlantic, and
worldwide, in an evolving web of global administrative law (Kingsbury et al. ;
Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth ). Levi-Faur (, ) writes:
[T]he new order [of regulatory capitalism] is diffused rather than reproduced
independently as a discrete event in each country and sector. Diffusion is a
reflection of an increasingly interdependent world. Beyond economic interdependencies, there is a growth of “horizontal” channels of diffusion and an
increase in the export and import of institutions and knowledge.
But the fact that we observe similar legal rules, policies, or institutions arising
in multiple places does not necessarily mean that the identical idea has been (or
should be) adopted in every place. There may be variation in the content of the
idea as it is adopted in different places. RIA adopted in one country may have a different institutional role and analytic content than RIA adopted in other countries
(Radaelli ; Wiener and Alemanno ). Careful comparison of the elements
of each RIA system and ROB will be helpful in distinguishing what precisely was
borrowed from where. And even if the idea is essentially the same in each place
we observe it arising, that does not necessarily mean that the idea was learned
and eagerly borrowed by one place from another; it might, for example, have been
imposed coercively by a colonial power (Elkins and Simmons ; Simmons et
al. ), or imitated unthinkingly as a passing fad (Lazer ), or arisen independently in each place in response to similar but independent conditions (as in
“convergent evolution” and related concepts in biology, see Losos ). Dobbin,
Simmons, and Garrett (, –) warn:
One weakness of many of the studies in this arena is that they take simple diffusion to be evidence of learning, without looking at whether there
was evidence of the efficacy of a policy innovation before second- and
third- movers adopted it . . . .[R]ational learning theory implies a kind of
cost-benefit analysis . . . .People may draw lessons by observing the effects of
policies other countries adopt, and they may engage in Bayesian updating,
in which they constantly add new bits of evidence to the existing knowledge
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base . . . the overarching theme here is that countries learn to pursue effective
policies.
A similar point is that successful legal borrowing involves a kind of cost-benefit calculus: an evaluation of policies and institutions in other jurisdictions and a decision
to borrow or translate the version that appears most promising for one’s own needs
(Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Stone ). This kind of calculus—essentially what
Benjamin Franklin advised—may be applied in horizontal legal borrowing across
countries and in vertical legal borrowing across local, national, and international
levels of governance (Wiener ; Levi-Faur ; Ovodenko and Keohane ).
The borrowing calculus that drives the diffusion of RIA and ROBs is undoubtedly based on a combination of factors. One source appears to be a demand, at
least among presidents, to manage the growing regulatory state. Consider the
adoption of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act in  following the New
Deal, and the executive orders on regulatory review in the s and s following the burst of regulatory legislation of the preceding decade. Similarly, in
Europe, Better Regulation and the IAB arose after the growth of EU regulation in
the s. A similar pattern may be at work in other countries. The presidential
impetus to manage the regulatory state through BCA, RIA, and ROBs can focus on
reducing costs and cutting red tape, but it can also seek to increase social net benefits through promotion of desirable new regulations (Kagan ; Graham ;
Revesz and Livermore ). In addition, economic crises and fears about economic competitiveness appear to spur regulatory reform efforts—for example, in
the United States after the stagflation of the late s, in Europe with the Lisbon
Agenda of jobs and growth since , and in Korea and Mexico after economic
crises in the s (Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone , Truen ). Looking
ahead, RIA and ROBs will be more likely to be adopted if their methods can be
made less costly and more beneficial, especially in lower-income countries facing
constraints on administrative capacity.
Evidence is accumulating that policy approaches to RIA and regulatory
oversight have actually been borrowed, based on learning about efficacy, across
countries. Research on the emergence of “global administrative law” reflects
both hybridization and the role of purposive actors consciously borrowing ideas
(Kingsbury et al. ). There is clearly an epistemic community of experts sharing experiences about RIA and ROBs across countries; examples include Radaelli
(), Renda (), Jacobs (), Cordova-Novion and Jacobzone (),
Quah and Toh (), Truen (), Wiener (), Wiener and Alemanno
(), and this volume itself. The OECD has been a major supplier of information
and encouragement on regulatory quality improvement not only in OECD member states but around the world, as have the overseas development agencies of key
countries like the United States and Germany. Direct testimonial evidence is also
available; consider this express account of borrowing in the EU Better Regulation
initiative by the prime minister of Ireland:
Better Regulation is a core theme of our EU Presidency and featured prominently at the recent Spring Economic Council . . . .There is a long tradition in
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American Public Administration of focusing on the quality and impact of
regulation. Many of the policies, institutions, and tools that support Better
Regulation have their origins in the U.S.A . . . .There is much that we have
learned from the United States in relation to regulatory management and,
through occasions like this, much that we can continue to learn . . . .We hope
too that there will be shared learning. While we in the European Union are
newer to the game, I hope that we have moved beyond our rookie season! The
Union is making up ground quickly in respect of Better Regulation. This is as
it should be. There is a deeper understanding within the European Institutions
and Member States of the need for regulatory reform.
—Ahern 
A further kind of evidence is statistical analysis of the timing and location of the
adoption of RIA across countries. De Francesco () tested the historical pattern
for the influence of several plausible variables. He found that trade relations and
the country’s legal system family were not significant predictors of RIA adoption;
prior adoption of other information access laws helped predict RIA adoption; the
OECD was important more for its information-sharing facility than for its nudging efforts; and the most influential factor in adoption of RIA, in De Francesco’s
model, was a country’s connection to transnational information networks offering
knowledge about regulatory innovations.

From National Styles to Regulatory Evolution
This pattern of diffusion has important implications for the comparison and evolution of law. Comparative law has traditionally presumed that important differences
across countries are explained by discrete “national styles of regulation” (Vogel
), “families” of legal systems (Zweigert and Kotz ), and early “legal origins”
(La Porta et al. ). The economic analysis of “legal origins” (La Porta et al. )
draws broad generalizations about modern business rules by grouping countries
into ancient legal families (English, French, German, etc.) (for critiques of the “legal
origins” literature, see Roe ; Curran ; Michaels ). Comparative law
scholars have long recognized the possibilities for legal borrowing (Watson ),
though often these transplants are individual doctrines, which may take root in the
other system, or wither, or act as irritants—rare grafts from one discrete legal system into another, whose reception in the second legal system is precarious.
But as Reimann () pointed out, extensive diffusion of legal ideas can
erode the traditional categories of comparative law that are based on discrete
national legal systems. The reality of major reforms of regulatory systems around
the world, through BCA, RIA and ROBs, suggests that the model of stable discrete
national styles of regulation, or early legal origins determining modern regulation,
needs substantial rethinking. De Francesco () finds little or no evidence that
national legal origin explains modern adoption of RIA. Vogel () concedes that
national regulatory systems are far more open to wholesale change than he had
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previously argued (Vogel ). Even the “legal origins” advocates allow (in passing) that “legal origins” may not account for regulations in what they label “new
spheres of social control,” nor for regulations adopted following crisis events (La
Porta et al. , , )—two of the leading characteristics of risk regulation
and regulatory reform.
Diffusion and hybridization are powerful forces in regulatory evolution.
Hybridization, in law as in biology, exchanges genes or memes, and thereby
interpenetrates the boundaries of “species,” “systems,” “families,” and “styles.”
Hybridization creates hybrid offspring that are neither convergent with nor divergent from the prior populations, but new; they do not always succeed and are
often less fit, but they prosper when conditions change, opening niches for which
the hybrids are well adapted. Undertaking both a dozen qualitative in-depth case
studies and a quantitative analysis of a large-N sample of risks, Wiener et al. ()
find that U.S. and European systems of risk regulation are undergoing substantial
hybridization, exchanging ideas on many topics, including precaution, better regulation, impact assessment, regulatory oversight, economic incentive instruments,
information disclosure, and other key elements. Risk regulation lives in an unfolding network society (Castells ; Slaughter ; De Francesco ). The result
is that it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish or generalize about separate
regulatory systems with discrete characters. Countries and cultures caricatured as
sharply different turn out to share a great deal (Baldwin ). Amid such hybridization, claims of discrete national legal systems or families become stereotypes of
a bygone era (if it ever existed).
This does not mean that no comparisons can be made. (Such a claim would
itself be a hasty generalization drawn from inadequate data.) The view that comparative law is impossible because legal systems are so intrinsically different from
each other that rules cannot be compared—what Siems (, , ) critiques as
the “strong form” of the claim of the “end of comparative law”—is both self-negating (it depends on the very kind of sharp comparison that it purports to deny)
and empirically unsupported (because the United States, Europe, and, increasingly, other countries are sharing legal ideas, not veering off on separate paths). As
Hiram Chodosh has nicely shown, those who assert that “comparing apples and
oranges” is impossible are committing three errors: first, people do in fact compare
apples and oranges at the grocery store every day (in terms of taste, color, shape,
price, and so on); second, using the phrase “apples and oranges” itself requires a
comparison between the two fruits (to deem them so different); and third, such
an assertion itself rests on a comparison between the degree of contrast between
the two fruits and the degree of contrast between the other two items sought to be
compared (Chodosh ). (This defense of comparison applies not only to comparative law but to critiques of BCA as well.) Comparisons can and must be made,
but on the basis of much more systematic empirical study, rather than generalizing to “national styles” based on a small and biased sample. The real tableau is a
complex and evolving landscape that defies easy generalization—the busy world
depicted with evident affection by both Pieter Brueghel (a medieval European)
and Richard Scarry (a more modern American). An improved understanding will
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involve comparison of rules and institutions as modules or memes that can be
exchanged across interconnected legal systems, rather than of categorical generalizations about national legal systems or legal origins.

Regulatory Foresight
Many of the contemporary debates over BCA and RIA were foreseen, of course, by
Benjamin Franklin. He wrote to his friend, the English scientist Joseph Priestley,
about whether Priestley should accept a new job (Franklin ):
In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I
cannot for want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if
you please I will tell you how. When those difficult Cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because while we have them under Consideration, all the Reasons
pro and con are not present to the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one
Set present themselves, and at other times another, the first being out of Sight.
Hence the various Purposes or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the
Uncertainty that perplexes us.
To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into
two Columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during three or four Days Consideration, I put down under the different heads
short Hints of the different Motives, that at different Times occur to me, for
or against the Measure. When I have thus got them all together in one View,
I endeavour to estimate their respective Weights; and where I find two, one
on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out. If I find a Reason pro
equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two
Reasons con, equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus
proceeding I find at length where the Ballance lies; and if after a Day or two
of farther consideration, nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either
side, I come to a Determination accordingly. And, tho’ the Weight of Reasons
cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is
thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me,
I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash Step; and in fact I
have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, in what may be called
Moral or Prudential Algebra.
Franklin appears to have anticipated so many core aspects of BCA and RIA: the
pitfalls of neglecting important impacts; the need for a structured approach to identifying and weighing the pros and cons; the inevitability of uncertainty; the need to
“estimate their respective weights” but the inability to achieve mathematical precision (yet still an “Equation . . . Algebra”); the issue of commensurability (crossing out
like items); the avowedly normative (“moral or prudential”) exercise; the use of BCA
as a tool to help us “judge better,” not an arithmetic rule; the cognitive approach to
BCA as a tool to get all key aspects (“the whole”) to appear “present to the Mind at
the same time”; the behavioral role of BCA as a tool to avoid “a rash Step.”
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The letter itself illustrates the transatlantic diffusion of BCA via epistemic
communities. It also records the diffusion of BCA preceding the establishment of
RIA and ROBs. Franklin wrote to Priestley, and Priestley was in communication
with Jeremy Bentham, who later wrote that he learned key elements of utilitarianism from Priestley (Bentham ); at least one historian suggests that Bentham
got the idea of dividing and weighing the pros and cons from Franklin (Viner ,
), though it is difficult to find evidence that Franklin and Bentham communicated directly (perhaps through Priestley). An intriguing additional possibility, difficult to document, is that Franklin, Priestley, and Bentham influenced the French
engineer-economist Jules Dupuit, who developed the mathematics of marginal
BCA in the early s (Ekelund and Hebert ). Among other possible connections to Dupuit are that Franklin and Bentham each spent considerable time in
Paris (Franklin was the American ambassador to France from  to ), and
Bentham’s work was published in French by Etienne Dumont in the early s.
(Franklin’s algebra was also later employed by Charles Darwin, to decide whether
to marry, in ; a possible link is that Franklin had known Darwin’s grandfathers, Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgwood.) Franklin also helped send French
engineers to America to assist with the Revolutionary War—a role that soon after
contributed to the formation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, modeled on the
French Corps des Ponts et Chaussées, the group that included Jules Dupuit. And
much later, of course, BCA was apparently first applied in the U.S. government by
the Army Corps of Engineers under the Flood Control Act of  (Quah and Toh
; Hines ).
The foresight needed in regulation is not only Ben Franklin’s foresight about
how to do BCA, but foresight about risks and regulatory impacts. In order to
weigh the pros and cons, we need ways to foresee those pros and cons. That is the
function of risk assessment, and of RIA. Foresight is also the ambition of precaution. Although precaution and RIA are often portrayed as antagonists, they are
better understood as complementary components of a deeper phenomenon: the
diffusion of regulatory foresight. Both precaution and RIA are efforts to forecast
the future consequences of current choices.
Humans have a capacity to envision future scenarios, but these scenarios tend
to be constructed in the brain out of fragments of our memories, and so are partly
rooted in what is mentally available (Gilbert and Wilson ; Schachter, Addis,
and Buckner ). This property of bounded foresight helps explain the observation that public risk perceptions are often galvanized by “available” recent crisis
events (Sunstein and Kuran ). Precaution is an effort to foresee and prevent
such risks before they occur. On the other side of the same coin, RIA is an effort
to foresee the impacts of risk regulatory policies and ensure they are desirable.
Meanwhile, policy diffusion itself can be vulnerable to the availability heuristic if
policymakers adopt what they happen to see rather than what careful study would
recommend (Elkins and Simmons ).
Regulatory foresight is increasingly demanded as societies prosper and, ironically, as they become safer. Increased demand for regulation is spurred by factors including prosperity, impersonal commerce, advancing science, crisis events,
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and rising safety itself. Prosperity reduces immediate risks to survival and extends
longevity. But prosperity also feeds a rising demand for amenities such as environmental quality and risk protection, enhances the scientific methods used to
detect more subtle and latent risks, and brings new technologies that reduce some
risks but may create new risks. These factors help explain the increasing demand
for precautionary policies in prosperous, safer countries—a phenomenon criticized by Wildavsky (), but perhaps understandable if demand for risk protection increases with income. Lower risk and greater longevity might also shift the
demand for risk protection toward greater emphasis on latent risks, because even
though greater longevity reflects decreasing risks, longer life spans may also lead
people to care more about risks that may arise farther into the future. And, in a
decreasing-risk world, those risks that do occur may be seen as more unusual and
more outrageous by the public, spurring greater demand for protective measures
(Godard et al. , ).
But precautionary regulations to reduce those risks can impose their own
costs and ancillary impacts (risk-risk trade-offs) (Wiener ). Hence the rising
demand for RIA—a companion form of foresight. International diffusion of RIA
and ROBs are manifestations of the demand for regulatory foresight.
As a society becomes even safer through the joint effects of prosperity, precaution, and better regulation, that society may come to confront even lowerprobability, higher-consequence risks—extreme catastrophic risks that would
otherwise escape attention but that could be highly worth preventing (Posner
; Sunstein ). Scientific detection capabilities improve with prosperity
and continuing research. Longer life spans mean that extreme risks become more
plausible within one’s own lifetime and the lifetime of one’s children and grandchildren. And the bequest value to the living of protecting future generations
may increase with wealth, safety, and foresight. (Whereas the Environmental
Kuznets Curve hypothesis suggests that pollution levels would rise and then
fall as a society becomes ever wealthier, this risk-prosperity-foresight hypothesis suggests that risks would shift toward the tail of remote risks as a society
prospers and reduces familiar risks.) But these extreme risks may nonetheless
go neglected where they are so rare that no present or memorable incident triggers the “availability” heuristic (Weber ). Furthermore, catastrophic risks
may be neglected where the losses would be so large that the public becomes
numb to their magnitude (Slovic ), and where the catastrophe would wipe
out the very institutions meant to provide remedies and ex post sanctions (thus
weakening ex ante incentives for prevention). These are “tragedies of the uncommons” (Wiener ; Wiener ), and they pose the strongest case for precaution. Still, precaution against tragedies of the uncommons must confront the
twin challenges of priority-setting (choosing which extreme scenario to address,
even as such scenarios multiply when the probability worth worrying about
becomes ever smaller) and risk-risk trade-offs (because measures to prevent one
catastrophic risk might induce another). Thus, even in cases where precaution is
strongly warranted against uncertain catastrophic risks, the full foresight of RIA
remains crucial.
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To succeed, societies must manage both emerging risks (through precaution)
and the ancillary impacts of their own risk protection measures (through impact
assessment).
Both are forms of foresight. The international diffusion of these strategies
enables more countries to take advantage of their benefits, and enables researchers
to study variations across countries from which we can learn and improve such
policies. Both hybridization and regulatory foresight are essential strategies for
risk management in a changing world. But diffusion can go awry if policymakers
are not good students or are not well informed about other policy measures and
impacts (Elkins and Simmons ). To make the most of these strategies, we
should consciously construct a global policy laboratory (Greenstone ; Wiener
)—which in turn involves a bit of regulatory hindsight. We will need ex post
evaluation of regulatory policies and of the diffusion of regulatory oversight systems, in order to see what difference those policies and oversight systems actually
make (Coglianese and Bennear ). These retrospective assessments will help us
revise those policies and oversight systems, foster smarter diffusion, and improve
our methods of ex ante prospective regulatory foresight and policy choice.
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